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TThe years of the economic and financial crisis erupting in 2008 made it abundantly clear that the increasing use of models in the financial sector may precipitate severe losses, especially in periods of high volatility in the market and 
in the environment (danielsson, J. – James, 
R. K. – Valenzuela, M. – Zer i., 2016). 
The increased focus on model risks set 
into motion two trends in the financial sec-
tor, driven primarily by the regulatory au-
thorities. On the one hand, the idea arose that 
complex models should be simplified or even 
withdrawn. The first signs of this process are 
already present in the calculation of the regu-
latory capital requirement. The Basel Com-
mittee issued a recommendation on the with-
drawal of the sophisticated models behind the 
estimation of operational risk regulatory capi-
tal and on the replacement of such complex 
models by a simple calculation method using 
controlling data (BCBs, 2016/a). On the oth-
er hand, the need increased for measuring and 
managing the risks surrounding models with 
a significant business impact: for establishing 
a model risk management system.
in setting up the model risk management 
framework, even the definition and measure-
ment of model risks pose challenges to the 
organisation, but identifying model owners 
– which is the basis of any viable risk man-
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agement system – is even more problematic. 
The european banking regulation and super-
visory practice (eBA, 2014) refer to model 
risks under Pillar 2 and envisage their manage-
ment within the operational risk management 
framework, but they do so without offering a 
clear conceptual framework for this endeavour.
in the first chapter of the article, we review 
the changes in the regulation of model risk 
and put model risk regulation into the context 
of the regulatory responses given to the crisis. 
The second chapter presents an analysis of the 
concept of model risk and attempts to rethink 
and expand the model risk definition of rel-
evant literature on the basis of practical expe-
rience. The third chapter offers a glimpse into 
the methodology of model risk assessment. 
The fourth chapter explores which methodol-
ogy should be chosen for the management of 
model risk – given the nature and character-
istics of the risk – to maximise harmony with 
regulatory expectations and to make efficient 
use of the existing risk management tools and 
expertise of financial institutions. The chapter 
discusses in detail the possibility of managing 
the operational risk management process and 
the methodology to be designed for the meas-
urement and mitigation of model risk under 
the same umbrella.
ChanGES in ThE rEGulaTion  
of ModEl riSkS
Iván Bélyácz (2013) analyses in detail 
the evolution of the distinction between 
uncertainty and risk in the history of 
economic thinking. Although the literature 
often refers to the two concepts as synonyms, 
it is extremely important to distinguish 
between the two terms. in the case of risk, it 
is possible to define the probability of future 
events, while the likelihood of uncertainty 
cannot really be readily quantified.
in the past few decades, experts concerned 
with the estimation of risks did their best 
to ignore uncertainty and capture all future 
events by way of mathematical models as a 
projection of historical events. the advance-
ment of mathematics and the integration of 
mathematical and physical correlations into 
economics contributed to these efforts. the 
upsurge in the construction and application 
of models has become especially prevalent 
in the financial sector. We should, however, 
bear in mind that a model is a stylised image 
of reality that fails to handle any measure 
of uncertainty – such as a sudden shock to 
the economic or political environment – be-
yond risk. Consequently, the introduction 
and increasing popularity of models entailed 
the emergence and intensification of model 
risks.
The european regulation of the manage-
ment of model risks has a short history. Al-
though Basel ii warns, under Pillar 2, that 
the capital requirement should be sufficient 
to cover all significant risks, there are no pro-
visions on model risk specifically. in relation 
to the valuation of trading book elements, it 
stipulates that the models used for such pur-
poses should be subject to periodic review 
and that the valuation adjustment should 
cover the uncertainty of the model valuation 
(BCBs, 2004).
in reference to the models used for the val-
uation of derivatives, the Regulatory techni-
cal standards (Rts) of the european Banking 
Authority (eBA) – on which public consulta-
tion was launched in 2013 before its adoption 
in 2015 – specifically prescribes adjustments 
for model risk (eBA, 2015). 
Basel iii, in turn, already identifies model 
risk and measurement error as a focal point 
of the regulation, as an important part of 
the regulatory response to the crisis. Banks 
should address the measurement errors of in-
dividual models and should provide an extra 
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layer of protection against such risks. That 
notwithstanding, the regulation still does not 
include any definition for models and model 
risks and offers no guidance regarding their 
measurement. in terms of their management, 
the single tool identified in the document is 
the risk coverage of the capital framework 
(BCBs, 2011).
While the european union CRd iV direc-
tive still fails to address the definition of mod-
els, it is the first document to define model 
risks, referring to them among operational 
risks. According to the directive, “model risk 
means the potential loss an institution may in-
cur, as a consequence of decisions that could be 
principally based on the output of internal mod-
els, due to errors in the development, implemen-
tation or use of such models” (CRd iV, 2013).
Apart from the definition, however, the reg-
ulation does not provide for either the meas-
urement or the management of model risks; 
it merely requires institutions subject to the 
directive to specifically address model risks 
within operational risks.
Compared to european union regulations 
– which, apparently, have only recently started 
to assign more significance to this risk type –, 
the American provisions are far more detailed, 
thanks to the precise definition provided by 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
system with respect to models and the model 
risk management framework. Accordingly, 
“the term ‘model’ refers to a quantitative meth-
od, system, or approach that applies statistical, 
economic, financial, or mathematical theories, 
techniques, and assumptions to process input 
data into quantitative estimates” (Fed, 2011, 
p. 3). According to the Fed’s definition, the 
model consists of three components:
•	input: an information input component, 
which delivers data, initial assumptions 
and hypotheses to the model;
•	the model itself in the narrow sense: 
parameterisation, selected procedures;
•	output: a reporting component, which trans-
lates the results of the model into decisions.
in this article, we adopted this model defi-
nition and applied it for the purposes of fur-
ther analyses. despite the precise definition, it 
is not easy to define the models used by the or-
ganisation in practice. Although the literature 
offers some recommendations for the distinc-
tion between a model and a simple computa-
tion by definition, actual boundaries can only 
be captured at the level of individual institu-
tions by reviewing the internal frameworks of 
the given institution.
The eBA’s sReP Guidelines (eBA, 2014) 
defines the activities where banks commonly 
make extensive use of models. These activities 
include trading in financial instruments, risk 
measurement and management and capital al-
location (including lending policies and prod-
uct pricing). 
if the models are taken account of on a pro-
cess basis, they will be found – based on our 
practical experience – in the following addi-
tional areas:
•	risk management
 capital calculation models
 models estimating risk parameters (Pd, 
LGd, eAd, CCF, etc.)
 models supporting the definition of 
impairment rates
 models for the definition of ratings and 
limits (e.g. country and counterparty 
risk management)
 fraud prevention model
•	liquidity management
 models for liquidity risk management
•	treasury activities
 calculation of the value at risk values of 
trading activity (VaR models)
 cost of capital calculation
 margin requirement calculation
•	supply of credits and loans
 models used for the definition of internal 
financing premiums
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•	compliance
 filtering models for the detection of 
money laundering
•	strategic and controlling tasks
 stress tests
 planning models
Most models can be linked to risk man-
agement and, in particular, the prevalence of 
credit risk models is remarkable. 
The majority of authors considering model 
risks rely and provide detailed analyses on the 
models used by financial institutions. Never-
theless, modelling practices are not uncom-
mon outside of the financial sector either; 
examples include the pricing models of the 
energy sector, the models used for geother-
mal systems in environmental engineering, 
noise pollution or climate change models, the 
modelling of particle motion in physics or the 
forecast models applied in the agricultural sec-
tor. That notwithstanding, it is undoubtedly 
the deficiencies of the models used by finan-
cial institutions that may have a direct finan-
cial impact on retail, corporate or institutional 
clients or on the performance of the economy. 
in line with the main focus of the literature 
and our own practical experiences, in examin-
ing model risks, this article also concentrates 
on the financial sector in general and on banks 
in particular.
how Can wE CapTurE ModEl  
riSkS?
After the definition of models, we attempt to 
illustrate model risk through the presentation 
of the lifecycle of a model used by – but at 
least commonly known among – most banks. 
Basel ii permitted banks to adopt Advanced 
Measurement Approaches (AMA) for the pur-
pose of determining their regulatory capital 
requirement. The AMA refers to an internal 
model using sophisticated and complex math-
ematical and statistical methods. This model is 
especially suitable for illustrating model risks 
because even its adoption was received with 
harsh criticism; subsequently, the Basel Com-
mittee proposed to standardise and tighten 
the parameterisation and environment of the 
model and eventually, it recommended the 
complete withdrawal of the methodology.
Parallel to the issue of the recommenda-
tions, the consultative documents published 
by banks, regulatory authorities and consult-
ants effectively illustrated all of the possible 
deficiencies of the model and the risks aris-
ing from its application. This is the model 
that spurred the greatest controversy among 
experts and researchers; in addition, its entire 
lifecycle can be observed from its adoption to 
its withdrawal.
Before presenting the arguments for and 
against the model, we should review the con-
cept and regulation of operational risks. Oper-
ational risk “means the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people 
and systems or from external events, including 
legal risk” (MNB, 2015, p. 67). This risk type 
is sector neutral and may materialise at any 
organisation in relation to external and inter-
nal fraud, customer complaints arising from 
human errors, natural disasters or it system 
shutdowns, only to mention a few of the pos-
sible operational risks. This issue is all the 
more pressing for banks, as they are required – 
as of 1 January 2008 – to set aside the amount 
of capital required to cover their exposure to 
operational risks. The regulator permits the 
use of three options for the calculation of the 
capital requirement, the most sophisticated 
of which is the internal model based AMA 
method mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
This measurement approach simultaneously 
considers historical losses, the result of self-
assessments estimating future risks and test-
ing the quality of controls, scenario analyses 
aimed at the quantification of disastrous risks 
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and the content of external databases collect-
ing other banking losses. 
upon the introduction of the AMA model, 
maximising the precision of input data, pre-
scribing a closed it environment, manage-
ment reports and periodic validation ensured 
the mitigation of model risks.
The nature of model risks is aptly reflected 
in the concerns raised in relation to the AMA 
model, the most important of which – based 
on the model’s input, output and parameteri-
sation component – can be summarised as fol-
lows.
The Basel Committee justified its pro-
posal to eliminate the methodology by stat-
ing that the modelling of operational risk for 
regulatory capital purposes is unduly complex 
and that the AMA has resulted in excessive 
variability in risk-weighted assets and insuffi-
cient levels of capital for some banks (BCBS, 
2016/c).
The AMA regulation is limited to defining 
the modelling framework and provides more 
room for the design of institution-specific 
conditions. As a result, the majority of models 
were calibrated on an expert basis, ignoring 
sound mathematical/statistical analyses and 
backtesting. As a result of low-level standardi-
sation, calculations yield significantly differ-
ent regulatory capital figures across institu-
tions, which deteriorates transparency and 
comparability (PwC, 2015).
We may conclude that, despite the ini-
tial requirements and thorough supervisory 
and internal model validations, lax regulatory 
frameworks made the institutionalisation of 
modelling errors across the banking sector in-
evitable.
in determining the required regulatory 
capital figure, the AMA model relies far too 
heavily on historical-event data and thus, it 
does not reflect the true risk profile of the in-
stitution (PwC, 2015). Model risk is rooted 
in the assumption that future losses can be 
predicted from historical events. This train of 
thought, however, underestimates the signifi-
cance of uncertainty. Once again, this criti-
cism reflects the need to distinguish between 
risk and uncertainty.
Reliable modelling, first and foremost, 
depends on the proper quality and quantity 
of data which, considering the data sources of 
operational risk management1, are not always 
available. The time series is typically insuffi-
cient in the case of external and internal data, 
while expert estimates are distorted by subjec-
tivity; in other words, the risk arising from in-
put data is inherent in operational risk models 
(Sherwood, J., 2005).
The risk related to the use of the model’s 
output is the fact that banks, for the most 
part, view it as a tool for reducing the capital 
requirement and calibrate the model’s param-
eters according to this objective. Therefore, 
the results of the model cannot be viewed as 
sufficient for promoting sound risk mitigat-
ing measures and risk management tools, and 
they are not integrated into day-to-day risk 
management (Wyman, O., 2006).
After this specific example, below we pre-
sent an overview of the model risk approaches 
discussed in the literature. Lebel and Gagnon 
(2014) define model risk as errors within 
models and the misuse of models, while Bar-
rieu and Scandolo (2015) simply consider the 
hazard of working with a potentially not well-
suited model as model risk. 
in measuring model risks in the narrow 
sense, our baseline assumption is that risks 
are present during the entire lifecycle of the 
model – development, implementation, mon-
itoring, validation and audit – and typically 
derive from the previously mentioned three 
main sources, as illustrated by Figure 1.
As demonstrated by the examples, it is the 
models’ parameterisation and matching prob-
lems that the authors consider relevant to 
modelling or model risks; in other words, the 
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choice of statistical parameters used for the 
modelling and the extent to which the model 
matches real data. Practice and regulatory re-
quirements, however, call for a broader inter-
pretation of model risk. Shi, Young and Cao 
(2015) interpret the concept as financial loss 
or reputational damages caused by the use or 
the output of the model. This definition, how-
ever, offers no guidance as to where to look 
for model risk: where is the point at which it 
departs from the problems of the it system 
operating the model or from the errors of ex-
perts participating in the development of the 
model.
The debate erupting around and the argu-
ments expressed in connection with the with-
drawal of the AMA, as well as our practical 
experience demonstrate that the definition of 
model risk should be expanded further. 
Before formulating a broader definition, we 
should look at the model risk events of recent 
years. 
According to the sAs Global data2 da-
tabase on the financial sector, the number 
of losses stemming from modelling errors is 
extremely low; only 28 out of nearly 30,000 
publicly disclosed data items. As regards busi-
ness lines, the most frequent model risk losses 
related to flawed product development occur 
during trading and sale, asset management 
and retail banking activities (see Figure 2).
As a result of model errors, financial in-
stitutions may need to pay compensation to 
customers, penalties and other, compliance 
related supervisory fines, or face significant 
reputation risk effects. Losses may range from 
tens of millions to thousands of billions of 
forints.
Among the greatest losses on record was 
the loss incurred by a swiss financial institu-
tion due to erroneous option pricing during 
its trading and sale activities, which raised its 
hedging costs spectacularly. Losses resulting 
from the modelling risk of the retail sector 
Figure 1
Typical model risks and Their sources
Source: own editing based on Management Solutions (2014)
•	 faulty data definition and 
mapping;
•	 inadequate data update 
frequency;
•	data availability problems;
•	unreliable proxy variables;
•	 insufficient sample size;
•	 insufficient historical depth;
•	 lack of critical variables, etc.
input
•	 improbable model;
•	 incorrect assumptions or 
mathematical correlations;
•	 excessive sensitivity;
•	use of unobservable parameters;
•	 calculation deficiencies;
•	 lack of confidence intervals;
•	use of outdated models;
•	unstable model;
•	 insufficient analytical power;
•	use of models unsubstantiated 
by research, etc.
model
•	use of models outside of 
their intended purposes;
•	 extension of the model beyond 
its original scope;
•	use of the model is inefficient in 
practice;
•	 re-calibration and parameterisation 
neglected for an extended period;
•	use of inconsistent definitions;
•	 the model’s lack of credibility;
•	 incorrect conclusions, etc.
output
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amounted to an extremely high figure for a 
Canadian bank that miscalculated the default 
interest of nearly 28,000 mortgage loan cus-
tomers. When the error was discovered more 
than ten years later, the bank had to reimburse 
about usd 6 million to customers for over-
payment.
The scarcity of model errors in the database 
can be explained by the lack of a consistent 
definition, the difficulties of quantification 
and the fact that model errors are often attrib-
utable to other operational risks – e.g. system 
shutdown, incorrect manual parameter set-
up, development deficiencies – and therefore, 
they are not classified as such. Apart from the 
public databases, there are consortium data-
bases (pooled data sharing), through which 
financial institutions share their loss data 
anonymously. The most commonly known 
such database in europe is the ORX Consor-
tium database. The close link between – and 
occasional inseparability of – modelling risks 
and operational risks is demonstrated by the 
fact that the ORX database does not even have 
a separate category for losses stemming from 
model risks; they appear among operational 
risks.
in short, actual loss events suggest that 
model risks are hard to interpret indepen-
dently; their occurrence is often precipitated 
by operational factors. incorrect calculations 
may result from system errors or power outag-
es, but incorrect parameterisation could also 
involve user errors. inconsistent interpreta-
tion of the definitions used during the model-
ling process is generally caused by insufficient/
incomplete documentation, but the improper 
use of model results may also point to fraud or 
abuse. Bias in the data included in the data-
base may be the result of data collection errors 
Figure 2
decomposiTion of The number of model risks by region and business line  
(2002–2015)
Source: SaS Global data
Trading and sales
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or incorrect expert estimates. The correlations 
between modelling and operational risks are 
illustrated by Figure 3.
in considering the similarities between 
model risks and operational risks, we may 
conclude that the following is true for both 
risk types:
•	both are sector neutral: while they occur 
more frequently at financial institutions, 
pricing or business models are not 
uncommon in the energy sector and the 
telecommunications sector, and the use 
of models has also become prominent in 
the field of engineering, medical sciences 
and the agricultural sector. Operational 
risks are also characterised with this sector 
neutrality;
•	heterogeneous, hard-to-define risk types;
•	the risk/return correlation is irrelevant in 
the case of model risks and operational 
risks; the undertaking of higher risks 
does not promise higher returns. instead, 
considerations should be focused on the 
amount spent on risk mitigation;
•	there is no uniform measurement method 
for model risks and operational risks; the 
reliability of measurement is low;
•	risk management requires the participation 
of several units of the organisation;
•	responsibility for model risks is assumed 
by the model owner professional unit 
and likewise, the given professional 
unit or process owner is responsible for 
operational risks.
Based on this line of thought, in our view 
modelling risks should be defined and man-
aged in a broader sense, along with their op-
erational risk implications.
Accordingly, based on our definition, mod-
elling risks are losses stemming from the errors 
of the model’s input data, parameterisation or 
application, including the operational risks 
arising during the operation and application 
of the model.
Figure 3
broadly inTerpreTed model risks
Source: own editing
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MEaSurEMEnT of ModEl riSk
The truly painful losses an organisation 
may incur during the use of the models 
can be captured by the consequences of 
incorrect decisions. They may include the 
loss of customers caused by reputation risk; 
compensation to customers in response to 
customer complaints; the selection of loss-
generating investment opportunities; model 
errors giving rise to external or internal fraud. 
due to the diversity of models, quantifying 
the economic consequences of model risks is 
a challenging task. essentially, two approaches 
can be distinguished:
•	analytical estimation methods; and
•	the use of expert estimates.
several authors have attempted to propose 
an analytical estimation methodology, focus-
ing their attention primarily on market risk 
models. 
Danielsson, James, Valenzuela and Zer 
(2016) introduced the concept of risk ratio. 
suppose we have N candidate models to fore-
cast the same risk. in this case, the risk ratio 
can be defined as the ratio of the highest to the 
lowest risk forecasts produced by the models. 
if the various models yield very similar esti-
mates, then the risk ratio will be close to 1, 
which corresponds to a low model risk. in 
such cases, mutually validating each other, the 
various models signal the suitability of the se-
lected model.
Barrieu and scandolo (2015) argue that the 
multiplier introduced by the Basel Committee 
as an ingredient in the assessment of the capi-
tal requirements for market risks is a sound 
measure of the risk associated with this model 
(BCBs, 2016/b).
in addition to comparison with potential 
candidate models, a typical way to identify 
the risks associated with a model is by back-
testing; i.e. when the forecast calculated by 
the model is compared to the values of actual 
observations. However, once again we should 
bear in mind that, as Bélyácz (2013) pointed 
out, it is the uncertainty factor that cannot be 
captured by merely projecting historical data. 
Consequently, even backtesting is not fully ca-
pable of estimating the future performance of 
a model or filtering out its errors.
These examples illustrate that the quantifi-
cation of model risk – the model’s “goodness 
of fit” – is hard to define; it can only be com-
pared against the results of other models of 
unknown quality, or historical time series.
The subjective expert estimation methods 
(self-assessment, scenario analysis) described 
in detail in the operational risk regulation 
(HFsA, 2008) represent another group of op-
tions. As part of this exercise, based on data 
available and historical experiences, banking 
experts produce the best possible forecast of 
expected losses.
According to the methodological guide-
lines for supervised financial institutions on 
the internal capital adequacy assessment pro-
cess (iCAAP) and on its supervisory review 
process (sReP) (MNB, 2015), specific model 
deficiencies and their operational risk implica-
tions can be more easily identified and man-
aged within model risk. They can be captured 
by such adequate models as sensitivity analy-
ses and stress tests or conservative parameteri-
sation. By contrast, the guidelines emphasise 
that estimating the economic and reputation 
impact of decisions made on the basis of in-
correct results is an extremely challenging 
task. Given the difficulties of capturing the 
potential losses arising from model risk, the 
recommended method of safeguarding against 
such risks is the implementation of adequate 
risk management rather than the quantifica-
tion of – and capital allocation for – model 
risks. 
in the next chapter we analyse the manage-
ment of model risk with this train of thought 
in mind.
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rElaTionShip BETwEEn ThE 
opEraTional riSk ManaGEMEnT 
fraMEwork and ModEllinG riSk
As mentioned before, european regulations 
consider model risk – as well as the similarly 
recently defined legal risk and conduct risk 
– to be a sub-type of operational risks under 
Pillar 2.3 
The process of  operational risk 
management
The regulation of operational risks can be 
divided into two parts. On the one hand, 
the regulation defines provisions for capital 
allocation (quantitative requirements); on 
the other hand, it describes in detail the 
requirements regarding the risk manage-
ment framework of institutions (qualitative 
requirements). Of all the regulations and 
directives related to risk management, only 
those related to operational risks provide 
such detailed guidelines on the formulation 
of a risk management methodology; i.e. 
identification, assessment and monitoring of 
risks, risk mitigating measures (HFsA, 2008).
The operational risk management frame-
work can be captured from various angles; we 
can examine: 
•	firstly, the risk management process itself;
•	secondly, the practices implemented for 
the collection of the data required for 
efficient risk management;
•	thirdly, the personnel network participating 
in the risk management process and the 
accumulated experience and expertise of 
the participants.
The risk management process, i.e. the iden-
tification, assessment and monitoring of risks 
and the design of risk mitigating measures, is a 
universal practice; this cyclically repeated pro-
cess should be carried out for each risk type. 
in the case of operational risks, the regulation 
expects all financial institutions to carry out 
this process at least once a year (HFsA, 2008).
As regards the practices put in place for 
data collection, with a view to meeting quali-
tative requirements, the operational risk man-
agement framework consists of the following 
elements:
The first element is the collection of loss 
data, which involves the collating of histori-
cal events into a database and data analysis. 
data collection has a dual purpose: on the one 
hand, it provides input for the calculation of 
the capital requirement; on the other hand, it 
may serve as a basis for the targeted imple-
mentation of risk mitigating measures.
The second element is the practice of risk 
and control self-assessment (RCsA): we ex-
plore the risks that the institution may face 
in the future in the case of the given process 
and examine the extent to which the existing 
control environment is suitable for filtering 
out these risks. 
Thirdly, the practice of scenario analysis 
serves a similar purpose as risk self-assessment, 
except for its focus on low-probability risks 
exerting a significant impact on the operation 
of the organisation.
Finally, the fourth element is the key risk 
indicator system. The periodic measurement 
of risk indicators allows for the monitoring 
of risk deterioration and developments in loss 
events, and action can be taken, as required, 
to counteract the deteriorating trend.
in addition to these four risk management 
data sources and tools, the risk appetite frame-
work can be another option to improve risk 
control functions. in the case of model risks, 
risk appetite should be interpreted in the same 
way as in the context of operational risks: in 
reality, organisations have no “appetite” for 
such risks; they merely tolerate their presence 
at some level (Lamanda – Vőneki, 2015).
Apart from the process and the data sourc-
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es, a typical characteristic of operational risk 
management systems is the fact that they can-
not function properly without a well-trained 
and committed personnel network. The efforts 
of LORMs (“local operational risk managers”) 
or process owners are intended to enable the 
organisation to manage this heterogeneous 
risk type despite the difficulties experienced in 
capturing and assessing it.
The process of  model risk management
in consideration of the rules defined by the 
detailed American regulation (Fed, 2011), 
the process of model risk management can 
be summarised along the lines of the process 
illustrated in Figure 4.
The purpose of the process is to enable – after 
a thorough understanding of the models – the 
formulation of the control mechanisms that are 
designed with a view to minimising risks.
The first step in determining risk exposure 
is to identify the models and produce a model 
inventory. in view of the large number of the 
models identified, the need may arise for the 
classification of various model types according 
to some additional criteria. easy-to-manage, 
transparency-enhancing model families can be 
created, for example, on the basis of model pur-
pose, e.g. calculation of capital requirement, 
estimation of risk parameters, rating, limit-set-
ting, pricing, ALM or planning models.
This step enables the institution to gain a 
consistent picture of the units using the mod-
els and to identify the areas associated with 
the most significant model risks (Institute and 
Faculty of Actuaries, 2015).
After their identification, models are evalu-
ated. We perform the qualitative and quanti-
tative evaluation of the models on the basis 
of the criteria proposed by Management solu-
tions (2014), supplementing them by practi-
cal experiences. The evaluation is performed 
on the basis of three criteria: complexity, im-
pact on decision and materiality.
Complexity: low-complexity models are 
constructed on the basis of simple operations 
Figure 4
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and basic functions, while operating models 
of higher complexity categories requires math-
ematical or programming expertise. Control 
functions can be subsequently defined on the ba-
sis of complexity; for example, the performance 
of regular validation activities require different 
skills of the independent, internal validator.
The “impact on decision” criterion refers 
to the extent to which the results of the given 
model influence sensitive decision-making 
processes or the preparation of critical finan-
cial statements or supervisory reports. Models 
classified into the high-risk category consti-
tute the basis for decisions of key significance 
from the perspective of the institution, and af-
fect not only internal reports but also reports 
prepared for third parties, e.g. regulatory au-
thorities, rating agencies or shareholders. The 
evaluation should also weigh reputation risks.
The definition of materiality means the 
quantification and assessment of model risks, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. 
After the evaluation of the models on the 
basis of these three criteria, the institution 
can classify them – also in consideration of 
regulatory expectations – into categories and 
formulate standardised control requirements 
for the individual categories. it is important 
to perform this classification, as the impact of 
some models on business decisions is not as 
significant as the impact of others; therefore, 
the resources available for risk mitigation can 
be concentrated on the management of mod-
els with high loss potential.
in designing the control system, the follow-
ing areas may come into focus:
•	documentation of the modelling process;
•	design of model lifecycle, the content and 
frequency of the review;
•	independent external and internal validation;
•	model utilisation and its constraints;
•	change management;
•	data quality controls;
•	Model Governance and reports.
Although each criterion would deserve a 
separate analysis, discussing them in detail 
would be beyond the scope of this paper.
in the approach outlined above, the assess-
ment of model risks is assigned a lesser sig-
nificance – which is also justified by the lack 
of assessment methodologies –; instead, the 
focus is on the construction, execution and 
review of controls.
Integration of  modelling risk management 
into the process of  operational risk 
management
in the second chapter of this article, we 
provided an overview of the specificities of 
model risks and discussed their similarities 
with operational risks. We then proceeded 
to examine the operational risk management 
process prescribed by european regulations 
and, in the lack of european guidelines, 
presented an example for the individual 
steps of model risk management on the basis 
of the regulations prevailing in the united 
states. This chapter is intended to explore the 
possibility of implementing a combination of 
the two processes.
Identification
The first step in both processes is the 
identification of risks and the models. in the 
process of operational risk management, this 
step takes place in the context of workshops, 
with the participation of regularly trained 
contact persons appointed by the institution 
(LORMs or, in the case of process-based risk 
management, dedicated process owners). The 
communication channel put into place by 
the institution’s operational risk management 
unit and a decentralised risk management 
approach can provide a suitable framework 
for the identification of the models operated 
by the bank. since all units of the institution 
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are represented during the identification of 
operational risks, the experts participating 
in the given forum are in possession of all 
information required for the reviewing and 
identifying the models.
Assessment
Operational risks are generally assessed at the 
same forum where risks are identified. Once 
again, the expertise required to assess and 
classify the models and to define the related 
model risks is readily available. The complexity 
of the measurement of model risks depends 
on the methodology chosen. if the institution 
prefers expert estimates to the quantitative 
methodologies outlined in the third chapter, 
these estimates can be actually made at the 
self-assessment meetings arranged for the 
purposes of operational risk management. 
The difficulties involved in the evaluation and 
quantification of losses arising from model risks 
are also present in the case of other, operational 
risk type events (estimating the business impact 
of it system shutdowns, evaluating the events 
exerting a reputation impact). if the institution 
has already adopted procedures for these events 
in the framework of operational risk mana-
gement, they can be efficiently adapted to 
estimate the consequences of model risks.
Monitoring
The next step is monitoring, a process 
designed to minimise identified risks. As 
mentioned before, in the opinion of the 
regulatory authorities the efficiency of the risk 
management framework hinges on a properly 
functioning modelling process and built-in 
controls. in the case of operational risks, this 
monitoring function is performed by the key 
risk indicator system. The construction and 
monitoring of such risk indicators should also 
be considered for modelling risks. examples 
for the available indicators include (iFA, 
2015):
•	Number of models classified into the 
high-risk category;
•	Cumulated amount and/or number of 
loss events arising from model errors;
•	Number of models deemed unsuitable for 
their given purpose by the independent 
validation;
•	Number/level of model enhancements 
aimed at the elimination of the model’s 
errors and deficiencies;
•	Overdue model review;
•	Number of overdue model validations;
riSk MiTiGaTinG MEaSurES
in the case of operational risks, risk mitigating 
measures are defined along with the process 
of their implementation. if the institution 
decides to use key risk indicators for the 
control of model risks, their monitoring could 
be integrated into the existing practice.
Having reviewed the process, our proposed 
solution for managing modelling risks within 
the operational risk management framework 
is the following: the modelling should be 
considered to be a separate process, which 
should use the operational risk management 
toolset and involve the already established and 
trained expert network.
The proposed process is shown in Figure 5.
With the implementation of the process, 
the management of model risks would take 
place in the operational risk management 
framework of the institution, through the 
tools and methodology available therein.
ConCluSionS
undoubtedly, the increasing prominence 
of models that constitute the basis of an 
increasing percentage of financial sector 
decisions carries severe risks. Regulatory 
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authorities have attempted to manage these 
risks, although the level of detail regarding the 
requirements imposed on the financial sector 
differed from country to country.
Participants of the financial market may 
face a number of obstacles during the practi-
cal implementation of modelling risk man-
agement. in the first step, even the identifi-
cation of models and their separation from 
simple computation pose a challenge. At-
tempts to define modelling risks point to 
their close relationship with other risk types 
(especially operational risks), which often 
renders the identification of pure model 
risks impossible. The literature refers to sev-
eral methodologies for the quantification of 
modelling risks, but they are typically appli-
cable to a specific model type (e.g. market 
risk models).
in order to remove these obstacles, we pro-
pose the following approaches.
since european regulations refer to mod-
elling risks among operational risks, it would 
be worth considering the utilisation of the 
results, network and methodology of the es-
tablished operational risk management frame-
work for the purposes of identifying, measur-
ing and managing modelling risks.
Figure 5
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Accordingly, the model inventory could 
be constructed and the models could be classi-
fied during the process of model identification 
and classification with the assistance of the ex-
isting expertise of the network established for 
the management of operational risks, in the 
context of workshops and brainstorming.
Measuring model risks is a complex task 
without a uniform methodology; therefore, 
the primary risk mitigating solution should be 
a properly designed modelling process, rath-
er than the allocation of capital for covering 
model risks. This characteristic of modelling 
risks and the fact that such models are pre-
sent across all units of the organisation make 
model risks similar to operational risks.
Consequently the management of model-
ling risk should be based on the construction 
of a proper control environment. Costly deci-
sion mistakes associated with the increasingly 
frequently used models could be mitigated by 
a process structured around the controls inte-
grated into the modelling process, the period-
ic review of the models and internal/external 
validation. 
By constructing and monitoring key risk 
indicators, developments in modelling risks 
could be controlled within the operational 
risk management framework.
Modelling risk is the most recent risk el-
ement emphasised by the regulator among 
operational risks, with special recommen-
dations regarding its management. An ad-
ditional direction of research could examine 
other risk factors that may receive special at-
tention in the future as risks requiring sepa-
rate methodologies and special attention on 
the part of organisations and supervisory au-
thorities. in view of the expected regulatory 
changes, the question arises as to whether 
the simplification and standardisation of the 
models may lead to an increase in systemic 
model risks. in this article, we examined the 
management of model risks at financial insti-
tutions, but we believe that the issue should 
be also explored in the context of other sec-
tors. the financial sector is privileged in the 
sense that it has advanced risk management 
regulations and an established risk culture. 
As risk management expectations may be 
lower or non-existent in other sectors, in 
such sectors the identification, measurement 
and management of model risks may pose a 
greater challenge.
Notes
1 Based on legal regulations, the AMA model builds 
on four mandatory data sources (internal and 
external loss data, the results of self-assessment and 
scenario analysis).
2 sAs OpRisk Global data is one of the largest and 
most comprehensive information repositories of 
publicly reported operational losses in excess of usd 
100,000. it has been collecting and storing operational 
risk data since 2002. it documents more than 30,000 
loss events, which have been collected on the basis of 
published case studies and press information. Source: 
https://support.sas.com/documentation/onlinedoc/
securedoc/index_oprisk.html
3 According to the definition of the MNB’s review 
guidelines, conduct risks are a part of the legal 
risks associated with operational risks and they 
mean the current or prospective risk of losses to 
an institution arising from inappropriate supply 
of financial services including cases of wilful or 
negligent misconduct (MNB, 2015).
 studies 
116  Public Finance Quarterly  2017/1
Literature
Barrieu, P. – scandolo, G. (2015): Assessing fi-
nancial model risk. European Journal of Operational 
Research 242, pp. 546–556.
Bernard, C. – Vanduffel, s. (2015): A new ap-
proach to assessing model risk in high dimensions. 
Journal of Banking & Finance 58, pp. 166–178.
Bélyácz, i. (2013): expectations, uncertainty and 
probability. Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review) 
July–August 2013, pp. 749–780.
danielsson, J. – James, R. K. – Valenzuela, M. 
– Zer i. (2016): Model risk of risk models. Journal of 
Financial Stability 23, pp. 79–91.
Lamanda, G. – tamás-Vőneki, Zs. (2015): Hun-
gry for Risk: A risk appetite framework for operational 
risks. Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 60, issue 2015/2, 
pp. 217–230.
Lebel, d. – Gagnon, s. C. (2014): Building 
model trust. Best’s Review, september 2014, pp. 
101–104. 
Moosa, i. A. (2008): A critique of the advanced 
measurement approach to regulatory capital against 
operational risk. Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 
9, issue 3, pp. 151–164. Online: http://link.springer.
com/article/10.1057/jbr.2008.7 (downloaded: 3 June 
2016).
sherwood, J. (2005): Operational Risk – Key 
Problems with the Advanced Measurement Approach. 
25 April, 2005. Online: https://www.gtnews.com/
articles/operational-risk-key-problems-with-the-ad-
vanced-measurement-approach/
shi, Y. – Young, W. H. – Cao, R. (2015): On aggre-
gate model risk management: Focus on stress testing. 
Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 
Vol. 8, pp. 171–195.
Wyman, O. (2006): Beyond AMA – Putting opera-
tional risk models to good use. Online: http://www.
oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/
en/2016/mar/Oliver-Wyman-Beyond-AMA.PdF 
(downloaded: 10 July 2016).
Basel Committee on Banking supervision, BCBs 
(2004): international Convergence of Capital Meas-
urement and Capital standards, June 2004. Online: 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf (downloaded: 
2 July 2016).
Basel Committee on Banking supervision, BCBs 
(2011): Basel iii: A global regulatory framework for 
more resilient banks and banking systems, June 2011. 
Online: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf (down-
loaded: 30 October 2016).
Basel Committee on Banking supervision, BCBs 
(2016/a): standardised Measurement Approach for 
operational risk. Consultative document, March 
2016. Online: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d355.
pdf (downloaded: 2 July 2016).
Basel Committee on Banking supervision, BCBs 
(2016/b): Minimum capital requirements for market 
risk, January 2016. Online: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/d352.pdf (downloaded: 2 July 2016).
Basel Committee on Banking supervision, BCBs 
(2016/c): Basel Committee issues proposed revisions 
to the operational risk capital framework, 4 March 
2016. Online: http://www.bis.org/press/p160304.htm 
(downloaded: 2 July 2016).
Basel Committee on Banking supervision, BCBs 
(2004): international Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital standards, June 2004. Online: http://www. 
bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf (downloaded: 2 July 2016). 
Basel Committee on Banking supervision, BCBs 
(2011): Basel iii: A global regulatory framework for 
 studies 
Public Finance Quarterly  2017/1 117
more resilient banks and banking systems, June 2011. 
Online: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf (down-
loaded: 30 October 2016).
Basel Committee on Banking supervision, BCBs 
(2016/a): standardised Measurement Approach for 
operational risk. Consultative document, March 
2016. Online: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d355.
pdf (downloaded: 2 July 2016).
Basel Committee on Banking supervision, BCBs 
(2016/b): Minimum capital requirements for market 
risk, January 2016. Online: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/d352.pdf (downloaded: 2 July 2016).
Basel Committee on Banking supervision, BCBs 
(2016/c): Basel Committee issues proposed revisions 
to the operational risk capital framework, 4 March 
2016. Online: http://www.bis.org/press/p160304.htm 
(downloaded: 2 July 2016).
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system, 
Fed (2011): supervisory guidance of model risk man-
agement, 4 April 2011. Online: https://www.federal-
reserve.gov/bankinforeg/srletters/sr1107a1.pdf (down-
loaded: 9 July 2016).
Cognizant: Models, Model Risk and Running ef-
fective Model Management Programs, April 2015. 
Online: https://www.cognizant.com/whitepapers/
model-risk-and-running-effective.pdf (downloaded: 
10 July 2016).
HFsA (2008): Validation Guidelines, June 2008. 
Online: https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/vkk-ii-20120511. 
pdf (downloaded: 3 June 2016).
PwC (2015): Operational Risk: The end of inter-
nal modelling? december 2015. Online: https://www.
pwc.com/gx/en/financial-services/pdf/fs-operational-
risk-modelling.pdf (downloaded: 3 June 2016).
